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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to understand how the level of globalization affects the public opinion
towards globalization. The reviewed literature traces the history of the most significant
developments of the current global capital system as well as the public opinion literature which
discusses relevant issues pertaining to the subject. Since globalization is highly correlated with
modernization, much of the literature will involve examination of modernization as well as its
critics. To test the presented hypotheses, Pew’s Global Attitudes Project Survey 2010 was used.
The question used as the basis of the dependent variable asks if the respondent believes
increasing business and trade between the respondent’s nation and the world was very good,
somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad. The results provide evidence that the level of
globalization a nation experiences changes how the nation’s public views this phenomenon.
Interestingly, while the level of globalization has a positive effect on public opinion, the levels of
political and economic globalization have negative impacts upon the dependent variable.
Additionally, a robustness model bore similar results.
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INTRODUCTION
Globalization is an ever-increasing and important factor in the daily lives of individuals
and in the functioning and planning of governments and societies. By participating in a system in
which there is little ability to extricate one’s self from, nation-states show themselves willing to
accept the influx and fusion of the various cultures and ideas from those nations seeking to
participate in the dominate system. Commonly, globalization is used to mean a continuous
increase in the number of international financial transactions and economic interdependence
(Reinicke 1997, 127). This trend has made profound impacts upon the international system,
some of which, however, have been negative in nature. The dispute over globalization is not
necessarily whether the consequences are acceptable or not; rather, the dispute tends to be in
whether or not globalization and modernization are positive. From this point of discord, two
main schools have risen up: modernization in opposition to anti-modernization. More precisely,
the research that is being presented here is seeking to elucidate how global public opinion
towards globalization is affected by the level of globalization and its accompanying
modernization.
The current global structure seems to be the perfect conditions for testing politicaleconomic theories since nations are at differing levels of economic development and
governmental arrangements but are still operating under conditions of American global
capitalism. The use of public opinion towards globalization is a means of judging the content or
discontent that is predicted by these theories based upon differing variables.
Globalization is one of the most salient aspects of the international political economy. It
is important to understand what comprises the international political economy to comprehend the
importance of globalization to the field of study. Frieden and Martin (2002) have a simple

1

definition: “[The international political economy can be taken] to include all work for which
international economic factors are an important cause or consequence. This ranges from the
politics of… dispute settlement, to the impact of international flows of goods or capital on
national political systems” (Frieden and Martin 2002, 118). Gilpin (1987) states a more precise
and functional definition: [Globalization is] the “market competition and the responsiveness of
economic actors to relative price changes [that] propel society in the direction of increased
specialization, greater efficiency, and the eventual economic unification of the globe” (Gilpin
1987, 65). Both of the definitions imply that globalization brings with it a set of regimes,
institutions, and organizations that characterize the current global capitalist system (Gilpin 1987,
65-6; Frieden and Martin 2002; Ruggie 1982, 379-82). Most importantly, globalization, as it is
currently known, is an American capitalist regime (Ruggie 1982).
This research seeks to understand if the level of globalization that a nation experiences is
related to that nation’s public opinion towards globalization. The answer is that there is a
statistically significant relationship between the level of globalization in a nation and that
nation’s public opinion towards globalization. Additionally, there are other factors that show
themselves to have influences on public opinion. Furthermore, these additional factors are direct
derivations of the expectations of one of the more identifiable movements that are critical
towards the global capitalism. Originating with the works of Engels (1844) and Marx (1867),
socialist and anti-modernization critiques provide many variables that are identifiable and can be
used in testing the expectations of social response to particular phenomenon. On the other side
of the debate, those supporting globalization in its current form have their own beliefs and
expectations of how society will respond to globalization.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
To reiterate Reinicke’s (1997, 127) definition given in the introduction, globalization can
be seen as the continuous increase in international and transnational financial transactions and
economic interactions. The seeming permanence of the monolith known as globalization can
make it seem ageless. However, its roots can only be easily traceable from the Age of
Mercantilism and the Westphalian Peace established in 1624.
Before moving on to the core of this literature review, it is necessary to establish two
definitions. International institutions are explicit arrangements and behaviors that are followed
by the international community (Stein 1982; Mearsheimer 1994; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal
2001). Krasner (1982) understands that an international regime can be implicit or explicit and
helps in the guiding of how a nation-state behaves and operates in the international community
(Krasner 1982; 186). Those institutions and regimes that are of the most concern to this research
are those ones which allowed or accompanied the rise of the modern global capitalist system.
Furthermore, there have been many innovations and developments that have influenced the
current system. Of primary concern is the development of the state. Second, the innovative
period which has great bearing on this research is known as the industrial revolution. Following
will be a discussion on the urbanization that accompanies modernization. The literature review
will continue with discussions of globalization in the 20th and 21st centuries under the guidance
of American capitalism. Finally, a brief review of public opinion literature which is relevant to
the variables will be given.
Historical Background of Globalization
Globalization, as we know it, did not appear from nowhere nor did any particular event
precipitate the phenomenon. Rather, the global capitalist system as it now functions was a result
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of many decades of events and series of events that all gradually paved the way for the next step
without much reflection on how certain events may actually influence the future. The two main
influences of our current economic system are: the development of the defined territorial state
and the industrial revolutions. The following discussion will highlight the development of
globalization and then proceeds to a discussion of relevant public opinion studies.
Development of the Nation-State
Of the many influential happenings leading to globalization, the first subject of this
discussion is the development of the nation-state and its continuance. The peace treaties
associated with the 17th century Peace of Westphalia unwittingly determined how international
relations were to be conducted for the next four hundred years by the Western world and,
increasingly, the globe. The current system of globalization, has its beginnings in the what is
known as the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 (Polanyi 1944, 6-7; Rosecrance 1986, 79-84).1, 2
Furthermore, the Treaty of Westphalia has had such an influence on the structure of the system
so that the United Nations Charter guarantees the protection of state sovereignty and
independence (Rosecrance 1986; Polanyi 1944; Angell 1911; Gross 1948). However, the
Westphalian system, as the system of nation-states has come to be called, promotes sovereignty
and independence within territorial boundaries (Schmidt 2011, 601-2).
The real effect that the treaty had on the development of the Westphalian state-system
was that it established defined territorial units for which serfs, citizens, and nobility could
become attached. This attachment to defined borders and sovereignty is the reason for why wars

1

Stephen D. Krasner (2001) disputes that the Treaty of Westphalia, which was actually the amalgam of the Treaties
of Munster and Osnabruck, established the state system as it is known now. While this may be the case, Meerts
and Beeuwkes (2008, 158) refer to the treaty as being the “embryonic facility” of what was to come.
2
This treaty was originally designed to establish the partitions of Continental Europe based upon religious ideals
which were eventually replaced by statism (Polanyi 1944, 270-2; Rosecrance 1986, 82-5; Columbia 2011). The
treaty was also the culmination of several peace treaties of continental Europe.
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are fought; the inevitability of war is based upon a state’s need to be secure in its own territory
(Rosecrance 1986, 83). Therefore, the only logical conclusion to the effects of the Treaty of
Westphalia was the rise of nationalism and a population’s adherence to a symbol of the state
(Rosecrance 1986, 85). From the need to protect one’s security as well as a need for continued
revenue sources and glory for the homeland, colonial imperialism was inevitable (Rosecrance
1986, 85). And, it is colonial imperialism which embodies a more aggressive form of
globalization.
All things considered in the development of the state, identification with a territorial
entity is most important. However, there is another equally important consequence that is
pertinent to the research being presented. The state, even under conditions of cooperation, is still
the dominant factor in influencing our lives. Globalization is predicated on the fact that nations
are sovereign but must sacrifice autonomy in cooperative efforts for international trade and
business. This identification with a defined territory is prevalent not only in international politics
but in domestic ones and in interpersonal interactions.3
Industrialization and the British Hegemony of the 19th Century
England has had a system that has favored the development of private property and
property rights, as well as innovation and entrepreneurship (Macleod 2009, 37). These are the
keystones of capitalism. The first industrial revolution, which occurred in Britain during the 18th
century, was fostered by the ability of innovators to capitalize on the worth of their
improvements (Macleod 2009, 37). By the start of the Hundred Years’ Peace, the
industrialization of Britain was well underway and spreading throughout the world (Macleod
2009, 37). The ability for individuals to profit from their work created an enormous shift in the
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For evidence of this, one needs only imagine one of the first questions most people ask upon meeting a new
person, “where are you from?”
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behaviors of the actors in the international system as well as disrupting the distribution of wealth
at both the domestic and international levels (Clark 2002). Furthermore, the shift in international
wealth created a shift in the balance of power now that the costs of war were rising exponentially
(Rosecrance 1986, 83-5; Meerts and Beeuwkes 2008). Power was becoming economic.
A brief synopsis of how the Statute of Monopolies (1624) could produce such profound
events is in order. The Act of Parliament known as the Statute of Monopolies (1624) encouraged
the formation of private property. Furthermore, by removing the barriers to possessing the rights
of one’s innovation and work, the Statute of Monopolies (1624) permitted the innovator or
entrepreneur to maintain the rights to profit from the creation for an extended period of time.4
The British Industrial Revolution is generally accepted to have begun in 1760 with the invention
of an improved mechanized loom (Rosecrance 1986; Meerts and Beeuwkes 2008). As a result,
both Clark (2002) and Macleod (2009) believe that the British Industrial Revolution was able to
come to fruition and affect the world system. As the industrial revolutions evolved, an
accompanying phenomenon was occurring.
Urbanization
An unforeseen concurrent event with the industrial revolutions was a major boom of a
state’s industrial cities as former farmers and agrarians flocked to these centers for various
reasons. The effects of this population migration from the rural society into the industrial society
were commented upon by Friedrich Engels (1844) in his work the Working Class in England.
Engels (1844) discusses how cities such as London and Birmingham experienced massive bumps
to their population, and cities such as Halifax and Leeds nearly doubled in size (Engels 1844, 1921). Madsen, Ang, and Banerjee (2010) discuss the cumulative effects of the urban-industrial
4

Section 6 of the act states that the rights to particular advancements, such as industrial innovations and
inventions, were to be guaranteed for fourteen years. The translation used can be found at Wikisource at the
following address: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Statute_of_Monopolies.

6

population booms with the right to maintain one’s intellectual property set forth by the Statute of
Monopolies (1624) as being the root of the explosion in per capita economic growth rates.
Madsen, Ang, and Banerjee’s (2010) study saw that there was a correlation between the growth
of urban-industrial populations and surges in per capita growth rates during their study.5, 6
Wagner and Ward (1980) study trends of urbanization in Brazil. With the rapid
urbanization of Brazil that occurred over the course of thirty years where the urbanized
population increased from 15% to over 50%, there was a seismic shift in the Brazilian
governments reaction to the phenomenon with intent to counteract the consequences (Wagner
and Ward 1980). This rural-urban migration in Brazil showed a relationship to the
industrialization of that nation which occurred during that period (Wagner and Ward 1980). The
true value of this research was in demonstrating that populations could exert pressures on their
governments without voting or protest by choosing urbanity over rural-agrarianism.
While the trend of urbanization as a result of the industrial revolution cannot be
justifiably denied, the reason for this effect can be debated and tends to fall into one of two
schools (Kelley and Williamson 1984). The first theory comes from Engels (1844) and Marx
(1867) according to Kelley and Williamson (1984). From the Engels-Marx perspective,
migration to the urban-industrial centers is seductive to the agrarian due to promises made by the
economic systems and availability of machinery that requires human input (Kelley and
Williamson 1984, 420; Engels 1844; Marx 1867). Additionally, it is this migration of internal
5

th

This research resulted in a negative correlation until the middle of the 19 century which is contemporaneous
th
with the writings of Engels. The positive correlation seen after the mid-19 century was attributed to the growth
in innovative activity that accompanied the Second Industrial Revolution. This would seem to indicate a certain
amount of interaction between population growth and innovation that results in increased per capita growth
rates.
6
The time period covered coincides, more or less, with the signing of the Statute of Monopolies (1624), which is a
major development on the way to industrialization according to the presented research. Additionally, if the
economic wisdom of the American Republican and Libertarian parties is to be believed, then it is these two
concepts that are the driving force behind economic growth. Furthermore, this wisdom seems to have some
empirical evidence supporting (Madsen, Ang, Banerjee 2010) the standpoint of those political party.
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populations that is a main disruptive factor of industrialization (Engels 1844; Marx 1867; Kelley
and Williamson 1984).
Secondly and conversely, Ravenstein’s (1885) publication has a different interpretation
of why there are mass internal migrations that accompany the industrial revolutions (Kelley and
Williamson 1984, 420). One of the main assertions of his work is that due to resource
constraints, most notable was available land, of agrarian societies forces or “pushes” the
population from rural-agrarian areas into the urban-industrial centers due to the availability of
factory work (Kelley and Williamson 1984, 420). It is not hard to see that both the antimodernization views, represented by Engels (1844) and Marx (1867), and the view represented
by Ravenstein (1885) agree on the phenomenon in principle – urban-industrial centers grow as
an effect of having more economic opportunity available when compared to rural-agrarian areas
– but not as to the cause of this emigration. However, what is important to this research is that
urban-industrial centers did grow at the expense of the rural-agrarian areas (Kelley and
Williamson 1984; Engels 1844; Marx 1867; Madsen, Ang, and Banerjee 2010).7
Modern Globalization
The Rise of American Globalization
During the interwar years between the First and Second World Wars, the United States,
and much of the rest of the world, returned to the provisions of protectionist policies as the world
sunk into a grand depression. Yet, following World War II, America capitalized on an
opportunity to reshape the image of the global structure under its guidance. America, seeing the
utter destruction wrought throughout Europe and Asia, solidified its territorial sphere of
influence against the Soviet Union which countered with the Warsaw Pact. For this section, a
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According the Communist Manifesto, the difference between these societal types would be obliterated (Marx
and Engels 1848).
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focus on America is two-fold. Primarily, America is the dominant state, some may say
hegemon, of the contemporary economic globalization. Secondly, the United States molded the
current global capitalist system whilst in competition with the Soviet Union for domination of
the global system.
The international economic order of the post-World War II era is significantly different
from the economic order of the previous age under the pax Britannica. No longer was the
laissez-faire mentality embraced to the detriment of the nation practicing (Helleiner 2006, 944;
Ruggie 1982). An early embodiment of the new order was the establishment International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) which were meant to help restructure and rebuild the Western world with America as the
banker (Dellas and Tavlas 2011; Williams 1945; Kindelberger 1951; Harberler 1953).8
Although the results of the Bretton Woods Accords may have faded, America’s dominance over
the modern global economic system has not. Furthermore, America’s dominance over the global
economic system is still perceived by just under half (49.5%) of the respondents from the 2010
Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey (Fig. 1). This is down 2.6% using the same question found
in the 2009 GAP Survey (Fig. 2).

8

The Good Neighbors Program during the 1930s and 1940s can be seen as portent of these organizations
(Helleiner 2006).
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Figure 1. “Who is World’s Leading Economic Power?” (Q25) from Pew GAP Survey 2010

Figure 2. “Who is World’s Leading Economic Power?” (Q15) from Pew GAP Survey 2009

Modernization and its Detractors
Modernization has become nearly synonymous with industrialization, materialism,
urbanization, and capitalism; more importantly, modernization indicates a destruction of the
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traditional (Hendricks 1982; Ouyang, Liu, and Zhu 2006).9 All of these things are noted and
described by Engels (1844) and Marx (1867). Furthermore, the rise of modernization has been
an accompaniment to contemporary globalization. The difference is that Engels (1844) and
Marx (1867) take a stance in opposition to these forces and will be discussed later; whereas,
modernization theory views these things as being more beneficial. Modernization theory, simply
put, examines how societies evolve, or devolve in the case of anti-modernists, as a consequence
of industrialization with the accompanying technological improvements and the move towards a
post-industrial economy. But more importantly, there is a shift to post-materialism that
accompanies modernization (Inglehart 1971; Inglehart 2006; Inglehart 2000).
With any massive change, critics are sure to come forth. In a preemptive response to
modernization, the socialist works of Engels (1844) and Marx (1867) detail the negative
consequences that are associated with the modernization of society. Even in the nascent stages
of capitalism and globalization, these authors were able to understand the profoundness of the
events taking shape around them. For this reason, a preponderance of this section will be framed
by these critics with support from more modern sources. The justification for this is three-fold.
First, the durability and generalizability of these theorists speaks to their recognition and
comprehension of the phenomenon known as modernization. Secondly, it is from the various
works of Engels and Marx from which many modern critical theories are rooted. It is important
to remember that Engels and Marx were writing at the height of British dominance and in
response to the industrial revolutions – the beginnings of modernization – of England and
continental Europe. Thirdly, a focus on Marx’s literature is the basis of Inglehart’s (1971)
seminal article finding that there is a shift in “advanced industrial societies” away from
“acquisitive values” towards “post-bourgeois” ones. Even Inglehart’s own words invoke Marxist
9

Hendricks (1982) analyzes the benefits of modernization in the health and care of gerontological populations.
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thought. It is simple to reword Inglehart (1971) in the following manner: as a society becomes
more post-industrial, the individuals tend to less self-interested and more oriented towards the
collective good. Yet, some of the critiques and troubles foreseen by the fathers of socialism have
come to obscene fruition under the age of America.
What began with a simple English improvement in textile manufacturing catapulted the
global society into a new and nearly unpredictable age of economic expansion and societal
destruction which has occurred over the last few centuries in various places at various times as
the world moved towards a modern age (Engels 1844; Marx and Engels 1848; Marx 1867;
Polanyi 1944; Schumpeter 1950). One of the more disturbing of the realizations of
modernization’s impact upon individuals was Engels (1844) assertion that human beings, more
specifically the proletariat, were simply another form of capital. A nation-state possesses its
population in such a way that if a unit migrates from one to another, then the unit is exclusive to
the new nation. For these reasons, larger populations could be seen as having effects on societal
responses to modernization.
Finally, as American capitalist globalization has become gradually more completely
global, it was only a matter of time before a Marxist theory would arise to explain global
capitalism. This was the Modern World System (Gilpin 1987, 68). This theory rests its main
assumption on the same premises of traditional Marxism but with a modern global twist: the
current age of global political economy is fundamentally different than that of the preceding age
(Gilpin 1987, 68). The point of differentiation is that the divisions are no longer based upon
class, but the divisions are now based upon a developed and advanced core replacing capitalists
with the advanced core of developed nations and replaces the proletariat or working class with
the backwards or undeveloped periphery (Gilpin 1987, 69). As in classical Marxism, there is a
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natural antagonism between the groups due to the oppression of the periphery by the core (Gilpin
1987, 69-72; Rogowski 1987; Hiscox 2001).
Public Opinion and Attitudes
Many studies have sought to examine the influences of public opinion. To this end, a
discourse on pertinent information related to the subject of this study – public opinion towards
globalization and its influences – shall be delved into. In order to facilitate ease, the literature
shall proceed in a manner similar to the order previously presented.
States, Nation-States, and Populations
With the dawn of capitalism, power became economic; it was a commodity. Whereas
more traditional theories view power in terms of populations amongst other things (Rosecrance
1986; Meerts and Beewkes 2008; Angell 1911), capitalism – and its global variant – believes
these to be commodities (Engels 1844; Marx 1867; Polanyi 1944; Gilpin 1987; Hiscox 2001).
Since owners of abundant factors – whether those factors are people, territory, or capital – tend
to benefit from freer-trade, they tend to push for more globalization (Rogowski 1989; Lu and
Tian 2008; Gilpin 1987; Hiscox 2001). O’Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov (2005) examine
how geopolitical determinants affect the public opinion in Russia. They found correlations with
rural residents, regional influences, and regional identification (O’Loughlin, Tuathail, and
Kolossov 2005). Considering populations as commodities or factors, the understanding of how
the owners of these commodities behave (Rogowski 1989; Lu and Tian 2008) combined with the
geopolitical correlations of O’Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov (2005) allows for the
development of hypotheses related to these aspects. In addition to the preceding, Wolpert (1988)
finds that there is a correlation between population size and the generosity of the cities in the
arts, health care, and welfare. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine if there may be a correlation
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between populations and its public opinion. However, this requires the assumption that
populations are owned by themselves and that the nation is owned by the residents. This
assumption does incorporate Engels (1844) assertion that populations had become commodities,
and it incorporates Rogowski (1989), Lu and Tian (2008), and Hiscox (2001) which describe
how abundant factor owners push for more globalization.
Additionally, Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1987) examine the effects of state culture on
public opinion in the US. The authors find strong correlations between region and public
opinion (Erikson, Wright, McIver 1987). Identifying with a particular region entails taking
account of its geography, urbanism, and personal party identification (Erikson, Wright, and
McIver 1987). The results of this research provided evidence that a particular US state has a
more profound effect on party and ideological identification than other many variables, such as
race, gender, and education. It is the partial basis for another hypothesis that concerns
urbanization which is in line with the works of Engels (1844) and Marx (1867).
Urbanization and the Public
A study conducted by Baloyra and Martz (1977) found that urbanization has a modest
effect on public attitudes in general. This supports Erikson (1976) and takes away from the antimodernization perspectives. However, urbanization has been shown to increase government
spending (Henderson, Monroe, Garand, and Burts 1995; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005).
Yet, Rudra (2002) found no correlation between welfare and urbanization in a multinational
study. Furthermore, the study did show evidence that welfare spending is affected by how
developed the nation is (Rudra 2002). This disparity is attributed to the ability of workers to
unite and prevent the dismantling of the welfare state in those nations that were more developed
(Rudra 2002). Finally, Rudra (2002) found evidence that the level of globalization in the form of
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trade flows has a positive correlation with welfare expenditures in nations. Combining the
insights of Rudra (2002) with those of Inglehart (1971), welfare can be understood to be the
post-industrial, post-modern public expression. Because of the increased societal benefits, one
could assume that urbanization does affect the public opinion of nations in regards to
globalization.
Globalization, Modernization, and Public Opinion
Hellwig (2007) examines if globalization affects public opinion towards confidence in
politicians. Conducted in France, this study showed that there is a strong negative correlation
between these two variables. The study discusses how confidence is a result of an expectation of
accomplishment (Hellwig 2007). Additionally, confidence is affected by exposure to the
international economy; more specifically, confidence becomes more volatile as exposure
increases (Hellwig 2007). Finally, this study found evidence of a negative correlation for
domestic policy demands and economic globalization (Hellwig 2007). A negative correlation
between the confidence of respondents in their government to handle economic issues and the
level of globalization was found using data from this research using a bivariate correlation (Table
1). These findings seem plausible and worthy of further study when considered with Drezner
(2001). Drezner (2001) finds that globalization is positively related to policy convergence
amongst nations. This policy convergence restricts what actions a nation can take independently
(Drezner 2001). With Hellwig (2007) and Drezner (2001) taken in conjunction, an exploration
of how the level of political globalization and participation in international organizations and
institutions effects public opinion towards globalization seems in order for this research.
However, the previous authors would seem to stand in contradiction to those that find that
representatives are responsive to public opinion.
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Table 1. Bivariate Correlation between Confidence in Government to Handle Economy
and Globalization Index
Confidence in
Government to Handle
Economy
Confidence in Government

Pearson Correlation

to Handle Economy

Sig. (2-tailed)

1

-.133

**

.000

N
Globalization Index

Globalization Index

Pearson Correlation

23886

23886

**

1

-.133

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

23886

24790

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The literature suggests that there should be a correlation between political globalization
and public opinion towards globalization. Inglehart and Rabier (1978) examine the public
opinion trends of the European Community. In their study, they found evidence that increasing
international ties resulted in a positive relationship with the opinion of citizens of the Community
member-nation (Inglehart and Rabier 1978). They found that increased exposure to regionalism
– a regional take on globalization – increased the public’s perception of the community
(Inglehart and Rabier 1978). This study provides a link by which the level of globalization
should affect the public opinion. Combined with of evidence legislative responsiveness (Jacobs,
Lawrence, Shapiro, and Robert 1998; Lax and Phillips 2009), this would indicate that
perceptions of globalization increase as the level of globalization increases which in turn and
over time results in higher levels of perception of globalization.
Bloom (1995) did a global public opinion survey on environmental issues. Considering
that the environment is ultimately global, there are some extrapolations that can be made. First,
the respondents on the survey showed that the global periphery and core have similar beliefs
towards responses to saving the environment (Bloom 1995). Most important to this research is
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that the study showed that the publics of the core and periphery both believe that strong
international and transnational institutions should be utilized to regulate the global environment
(Bloom 1995). The finding of Bloom (1995) support Speth’s (2008) claim that there needs to be
more international political governance in order to protect the environment from the ravages of
globalization and modernization. For all of the preceding reasons, this research will be
examining those variables which affect public opinion towards globalization.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
As has been discussed, industrialization is undeniably accompanied by the phenomenon
of urbanization. The more contentious part of the two phenomena is whether or not society
responds in a positive or negative fashion towards globalization which is the driving force behind
urban-industrialization in the contemporary age. Therefore, this research proposes three
hypotheses that examine these phenomena.
First, Polanyi (1944) refers to urban-industrial centers as being Satanic mills “grinding
men into masses.” Engels (1844) talks of the destruction of the traditional society as emigration
from the rural to the urban occurs. Wagner and Ward (1980) discuss the responses of the
Brazilian government to mitigate the effects of the rural-urban migration. For these reasons, it
seems reasonable to believe that there is a negative correlation between populations residing in
urbanized areas in regards to the public opinion towards global capitalism.
H1: As percent population residing in urban-industrial centers increases, the opinion of
the public should be less favorable in reference to globalization.
However, it is important not to discount the evidence of other more recent works. Urbanization
is an accompanying phenomenon of modernization and globalization. Urbanization has a
positive bivariate correlation with the level of post-industrialization (Table 2). Increasing postindustrialization has a positive correlation with GDP/capita (Table 3). Increased resources allow
for more generosity to the public. Therefore, increased urbanization could have positive
influences on public opinion towards globalization since globalization provides the means to
raise the capital necessary to increase welfare benefits by national governments. However,
because this logic tends to suggest what could be a more spurious relationship, the hypothesis is
phrased in a manner meant to convey a direct relationship as is implied by Engels (1844) and
Polanyi (1944).

18

Table 2. Bivariate Correlation between Urbanity and Post-industrialization
Urbanity
Urbanity

Post-Industrialization

Pearson Correlation

1

.623

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N
Post-Industrialization

**

Pearson Correlation

24790

24790

**

1

.623

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

24790

24790

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 3. Bivariate Correlation between Post-industrialization and GDP per Capita
Post-Industrialization
Post-industrialization

Pearson Correlation

GDP per Capita
1

Sig. (2-tailed)

**

.000

N
GDP per Capita

.693

Pearson Correlation

24790

24790

**

1

.693

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

24790

24790

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The second hypothesis would actually be more in-line with the theories of Marx’s (1867)
socialism or the post-modernists and post-materialists. For Marx (1867), capitalism was a
natural progression of human society from proto-communism and is the era prior to socialistic
utopianism. For the post-materialist such as Inglehart (1971; 2006), the post-industrial society
moves away from the “acquisitive” towards a more collective society. This is related to
generations of citizens experiencing life without a focus on the need to survive due to increased
economic development; therefore, these younger generations are more concerned with “quality
of life” (Inglehart 2006).
H2: The increasing post-industrialization of a society leads to an increase in favorability
towards globalization.
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Additionally, for reasons similar to those presented in the previous literature on urbanization and
the public, the fact that welfare generosity is positively correlated with the global core (Rudra
2002) tends to make this hypothesis seem highly plausible. This is because, to reiterate, welfare
is a question of the quality of life which is an accompaniment to economic development
(Inglehart 2006). Furthermore, welfare’s linkage to economic development is because of a sense
of worth becomes more related to a collectiveness in society rather than individualism which is
prevalent in the earlier and more opportunistic stages. Finally, bivariate correlation shows a
positive relationship between the level of post-industrialization (pindus) and the Globalization
Index (glob) (Table 4).
Table 4. Bivariate Correlation between Post-industrialization and
Globalization Index
Postindustrialization
Post-industrialization

Pearson Correlation

Globalization Index
1

Sig. (2-tailed)

**

.000

N
Globalization Index

.592

Pearson Correlation

24790

24790

**

1

.592

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

24790

24790

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The third and final hypothesis concerns how the level of globalization affects the public
opinion towards globalization.
H3: As the level of globalization increases, the societal approval of globalization should
be significantly affected.
The reason for the non-directionality of the preceding hypothesis is simple: the literature is
mixed on whether or not globalization affects public opinion. Additionally, the literature
suggests that different types of globalization are likely to have varying effects on public opinion.
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Therefore, the remedy for this conundrum is that three variables will be created for the model: an
overall globalization score (glob), an economic globalization score (eglob), and a political
globalization score (polglob).
The expectation of the overall globalization score is that there will be a positive
relationship. According to Inglehart and Rabier (1976), increasing ties within the European
Community lead to a higher level of post-materialist views, in which the respondents tended to
prefer actions that favored the collective good over the needs of individual nations. Second, the
level of economic globalization is expected to be positive. The reasoning for this assessment is
rooted in the findings of Rudra (2002) and of Avelino, Brown, and Hunter (2005). Both find that
increasing economic globalization is positively correlated with governmental spending such as
social securities (Rudra 2002; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005) and education (Avelino,
Brown, and Hunter 2005).
Finally, political globalization would be expected to be negatively correlated with public
opinion. This is understandable with the understanding that people tend to have their political
identities shaped by the region in which they live (Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1987;
O’Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov 2005). With political identities being affected by the region
in which one resides, residing in a particular nation shapes the political identity of its citizens,
and there is a sense of national sovereignty and independence which is built into the Westphalian
state-system (Gross 1948; Rosecrance 1986; Schmidt 2011). Therefore, since there is policy
convergence associated with globalization which constrains the autonomy of nations (Drezner
2001), people may perceive that their national identity is at risk. This perception of threat should
manifest itself in the form of decreased favorability towards globalization, in general.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Method and Dependent Variable
A binomial logistic regression is used to test the hypotheses, because this is the preferred
method when the dependent variable is dichotomous. This is the preferred method when the
dependent variable encompasses two outcomes. This research utilizes the Pew Global Attitudes
Project Survey from 2010. Twenty-two nations are surveyed with a valid number of
observations of more than 21 000 (N= 21 836). For the dependent variable (poglob), survey
question 24 was used: “What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between
(survey country) and other countries – do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good,
somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?” If the respondent had a negative view of
globalization – which was a result of either “very bad” or “somewhat bad” – they were coded as
0 (poglob=0). If the response was positive – a response of “very good” or “somewhat good” –
then the variable was coded as 1. This research uses individual level data for analysis. Finally, a
trichotomous version of this variable is coded for robustness. In the robustness model,
“somewhat good” was coded as 1, and “very good” was coded as 2.
Independent Variables
The first independent variable is the percent of the population that resides in urbanized
areas (upop). Taken from the UN’s Demographic Yearbook and the CIA’s World Factbook for
2010, the urbanity of the nation in which the respondent resides was coded using the raw data.
The second variable indicates the level of post-industrialization of a nation (pindus). To
capture the essence of this variable, the percent of the economy that was categorized as the
service industry was used for each nation. This was taken from the online CIA World Factbook
which contained these figures for the year of 2010.
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There are three variables of interest attached to the third hypothesis. Third, I use the raw
globalization scores to indicate the overall level of globalization (glob). This variable is taken
from the KOF Globalization Index. The Globalization Index divides the score is a composite of
three categories: economic globalization, political globalization, and social globalization. First,
economic globalization (eglob) contains data such as trade flows, foreign direct investment, and
trade restrictions which are used to form a composite scale that ranges from 0 to 100 (Dreher
2006). Political globalization (polglob) is the second variable of interest associated with the
third hypothesis and is continuous from 0 to 100. There are four aspects to this variable: the
number of embassies that a nation has, number of memberships in international organizations,
and the number of personnel per capita that a nation contributes to UN Security Council
missions. The final aspect is the absolute number of international treaties that a nation has
signed and ratified, and these treaties must have been filed with the UN Treaties Collection to be
included. It is taken from the KOF Globalization Index (Dreher 2006). Finally, the social
globalization aspect – which is not of interest on its own to this research – contains data on
telephone traffic, trade in books, internet users (per 1000 people), the number of IKEAs and
McDonald’s, foreign population, international tourism and letters, and households with
television per 1000 people.
There are still a few variables which are not of primary interest but which could be
having an effect on the model that need to be discussed. These control variables will be briefly
described with information on where the data originated from.
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Control Variables
The first control variable is the population of the nation (pop). This variable is taken
from the United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Services Historical
Population dataset. Raw data in millions is used.
Second and taken from the 2010 GAP Survey, the level of confidence in domestic leaders
to handle the government is used (confidence). The exact question is: “How good a job is the
(survey country) government doing in dealing with the economy? Would you say the
government is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job or a very bad
job?” “Very bad” is coded as zero and, in ordered ascension, “very good” is coded as three.
Third, a dichotomous control of whether or not the respondent believes the US is the
leading economic power is used (useconpwr). This is taken from the GAP Survey for 2010:
“Today, which ONE of the following do you think is the world’s leading economic power?” If
the respondent answered the US, then a code of zero was received, and everything else was
coded as zero.
Fourth, GDP per capita (gdp) is used as a control variable to judge the average wealth of
the nation. This is taken from the CIA World Factbook 2010.
Fifth, there is a control variable for the age of the respondent which was taken from the
2010 GAP Survey. This is used because of Inglehart (1971) used this variable in his landmark
study on the move from the “acquisitive” to the “post-bourgeois.”
Finally, the gender of the respondent was coded. Males were coded as 1; whereas,
females were coded as zero.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of the binary logistic regression present some interesting results (Table 5). As
expected, the urban population variable (upop) presented with a negatively significant
relationship to the public opinion on globalization (coeff.= -.009; p= .000). This finding would
support socialist and anti-modernist critiques (Engels 1844; Marx 1867). Although this was the
predicted correlation, it is still a surprising result. Considering Rudra (2002) found there to be a
strong positive correlation between welfare spending and the level of globalization as well as
findings that urbanization results in increased welfare and societal spending by governments
(Henderson, Monroe, Garand, and Burts 1995; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005), one could
have reasonably expected for the public to make the associations presented in the literature.

Table 5. Regression Results for Variables affecting Public Opinion Towards Globalization
Variables
B
S.E.
Wald
Sig.
Urbanity

-.009**

.002

30.046

.000

.007*

.003

5.070

.024

Economic Globalization

-.024**

.005

23.765

.000

Political Globalization

-.023**

.003

50.170

.000

Globalization Index

.030**

.007

16.754

.000

Population

.000**

.000

43.396

.000

Confidence

.506**

.026

369.863

US is Leading Economic

.290**

.043

45.077

.000

-.002

.003

.512

.474

-.079**

.022

13.122

.000

.014

.042

.114

.736

2.868

.349

67.615

.000

Post-industrialization

.00

Power
GDP per Capita
Age
Gender (Male)
Constant
N=21 836
* p< .05
** p< .01
2

Cox & Snell pseudo-R = .041
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The variable relating to the level of post-industrialization in the nation of the respondent
(pindus) was significant at the .024 level with a coefficient of .007. This was in the predicted
direction. By definition, globalization promotes interconnectedness of nations and people
(Reinicke 1997; Gilpin 1987). Additionally, globalization has already had evidence of a positive
relationship with opinion towards globalization in the European Community (Inglehart and
Rabier 1978). Furthermore, Inglehart (1971; 2006) found that there was a move to postmaterialism that accompanies the economic development that post-industrial economies
represent. Therefore, the findings of this research seem quite reasonable.
Another surprising finding is that increased levels of economic globalization (eglob) are
negatively related to public opinion on globalization (coeff.= -.024; p= .000). Although this is in
contradiction to the expectations of this research, it may not be so outlandish when considered
with the findings related to political globalization levels (polglob). The political globalization
result was in the desired direction with a coefficient of -.023 at a significance level of .000. It
was pointed out in the literature that increased political globalization constrains the actions of
nations and infringes upon its autonomy and sovereignty (Drezner 2001) which is embedded in
the Westphalian state-system (Gross 1948; Rosecrance 1986; Schmidt 2011). Additionally,
political identities have been shown to be shaped by the region in which one resides (Erickson,
Wright, and McIver 1987; O’Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov 2005). For these reasons, the
hypothesis produced supporting evidence; however, increased economic globalization also
constrains the actions of nations by definition (Reinicke 1997; Gilpin 1987). It could be the fact
that these constraints are seen as detrimental to the traditional society of the nation. Considering
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the aforementioned rationale, the negative correlation between economic globalization levels and
public opinion towards globalization does not seem so surprising.
The Globalization Index variable (glob) produced results in the predicted direction with
a coefficient of .030 at a significance of .000. This is in-line with the findings of Inglehart and
Rabier (1978) that found that increased regionalism within the European Community produced
higher approval for the European Community in general. It would appear that overall interaction
between economic, political, and social globalizations that result from overall globalization and
modernization is what produces a more favorable opinion towards the increasing business and
financial ties in the international community. In other words, the level of overall globalization
promotes a sense of post-materialist collectiveness that was discussed in Inglehart (1971; 2006)
and Inglehart and Rabier (1978) which increases the public’s favorability of globalization.
Finally, all of the control variables except for GDP per capita and gender attained
statistical significance. Most noticeably, the variable capturing the public’s confidence in their
governments to handle economic issues was positively correlated with their opinions on
globalization. This stands in contrast to the findings of Hellwig (2007) which found that
confidence in politicians declined as exposure to globalized markets increased. However, the
findings of this research seem quite understandable considering that if one approves of the
political-economic phenomenon of globalization, then they are quite likely to have confidence in
their leaders to handle economic issues within the country because of the aforementioned fact
that globalization is a process of increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of the
world’s markets. On another note, the variable representing age had a negatively significant
relationship with favorability towards globalization, which is in-line with the findings of
Inglehart (1971).
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All of the patterns discovered in the dichotomous model were supported by the findings
of the robustness model with some small exceptions (Table 6). Urbanity and postindustrialization did not achieve significance when comparing “somewhat good” to the reference
category “bad.” However, they did achieve significance when comparing the reference category
to “very good,” and the results were in the predicted direction. The results found for the various
globalization scores achieved significance in both favorable categories in the predicted direction.
This supports the results of the dichotomous model. Finally, the variable representing gender
had mixed results in the robustness model. When choosing between “somewhat good” and
“bad,” the relationship was negative and significant; however, when choosing between “very
good” and the reference category, the results showed a positive and significant relationship.
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Table 6. Robustness Results with Trichotomous Dependent Variable
Favorability of Globalization
"Somewhat Good"

a

B

Std. Error

Wald

Sig.

Intercept

2.009

.363

30.667

.000

Urbanity

-.002

.002

1.310

.252

Post-industrialization

-.001

.003

.185

.667

Economic Globalization

-.023**

.005

20.907

.000

Political Globalization

-.024**

.003

49.862

.000

Globalization

.035**

.008

21.540

.000

Population

.001**

.000

103.985

.000

Confidence

.469**

.027

291.370

.000

US is Leading Economic

.240**

.045

28.447

.000

.002

.003

.388

.533

-.059**

.023

6.906

.009

Gender (Male)

-.098*

.044

5.041

.025

Intercept

2.290

.384

35.512

.000

Urbanity

-.016**

.002

78.395

.000

.015**

.003

22.854

.000

Economic Globalization

-.025**

.005

21.262

.000

Political Globalization

-.023**

.004

40.131

.000

.024**

.008

9.458

.002

.000

.000

1.160

.281

Confidence

.556**

.029

374.788

.000

US is Leading Economic

.367**

.047

60.931

.000

GDP per Capita

-.010**

.003

8.532

.003

Age

-.109**

.024

21.083

.000

.185**

.046

16.353

.000

Power
GDP per Capita
Age

"Very Good"

Post-industrialization

Globalization
Population

Power

Gender (Male)

a. The reference category is: disfavor towards globalization.
N=21 836
* p< .05
** p< .01
2

Cox & Snell pseudo-R = .084
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CONCLUSION
This research has produced evidence that two important socio-economic factors have a
strong influence on how the public of various nations view globalization. The urbanity of a
population tends to decrease the level of favorability of globalization.
But more importantly, levels of globalization do have significant effects on public
opinion towards globalization. How is it that more politically and economically globalized
nations are less likely to approve of globalization, but are more likely to approve when overall
globalization is considered? This is a question that deserves much scrutiny. Why is there such a
disconnect between increasing international political ties and economic ones? One way to
resolve this issue is to more closely examine which nations tend to be more politically globalized
than others. It is quite possible that the core represents higher shares of political globalization.
If that is the case, then the issue is one step closer to being resolved. On the other hand, if this is
not the case, then this finding is more confounding. Regardless, these are issues to be developed
in future research.
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